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The process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats. 1 This definition will be used as the foundation of this analysis to determine whether senior warrant officers and NCOs effectively contribute at the strategic level. Essentially, if it can be determined that senior warrant officers and NCOs deliver valuable and unique contributions in any of these areas at the strategic level, then it logically follows that their increased participation at this level is both desirable and necessary.
Defining the Problem
The conversation on whether senior NCOs and warrant officers should be developed as strategic leaders typically focuses "how" the Army can better develop strategic leaders in these ranks. However, before looking at "how", it is necessary to ask "why?" Military training, education, force structure and resourcing decisions are all based on validated requirements. Changes to education or force structure requirements must be justified before resources are allocated. Therefore, it is important to first address why the Army should invest its resources in developing strategic leader competencies in senior warrant officers and NCOs.
It is acknowledged that senior warrant officers and NCOs will never hold the actual strategic leader position in an organization. Warrant officers may command at lower levels, but not at the strategic level. This is not to say, however, that they do not need to understand strategic leader competencies. Leadership scholar Dr. Stephen Gerras notes, "Realistically, only one or two percent of the members of an organization will ever attain strategic leadership rank or position, but, anyone working directly for a strategic leader should be well-versed in strategic thinking concepts in order to Military Education (JPME) should be made available to all enlisted personnel at every stage of their career. 7 This particularly applies to senior enlisted personnel, as they stand the greatest risk of being unprepared for key assignments at the strategic level.
The Chairman's policy clarifies the requirement by stating, "We cannot wait until an individual is placed into a leadership position before providing the proper education and training." 8 Essentially, the U.S. military should prepare senior NCOs for strategic level positions before they are assigned to them.
The Chairman's policy specifies senior enlisted learning areas that must be addressed in Enlisted Joint Professional Military Education (EJPME). These learning areas include 1) comprehend the process of formulating U.S. national security, strategic guidance, and doctrine, 2) integrate strategy, resources and contingency planning, 3) comprehend the Unified Command Plan, and 4) comprehend Service, joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and how these capabilities are best integrated to attain national security objectives. 9 Including these strategic learning areas as part of this policy implies a current capability gap and a validated requirement for senior NCO utilization at the strategic level. This is, perhaps, the strongest argument supporting senior NCO strategic leader development in the DoD.
In October 2010, NATO leadership developed and published a NATO NCO Strategy and Recommended NCO Guidelines document. In this document, NATO leadership highlights that the complex multi-national environment "will create more demand on the NCOs of tomorrow to be functional in both their traditional responsibilities and in their ever-evolving roles." 10 It makes the key assumption that within NATO there will be "an increased demand for NCO's who are prepared to work and succeed in a multi-national environment." 11 NATO leadership, like the Chairman's policy, recognizes that the fast-paced, complex operational environment of the future will require more leaders to understand and practice strategic level competencies.
The recommendations in the NATO document identify capability gaps in the NCO Corps of NATO countries. Among these gaps is a concern also shared by many leaders interviewed for this paper. The NATO document states:
NCOs arriving on operations or assigned to a multi-national military organization who do not possess a required level of leadership, knowledge, skills and abilities, or competence expected by a commander, can have a detrimental affect. This places the burden on other members of the organization to either train the individual or leave the NCO in the leadership role, with the hope that they will rise to the challenge. In the worst case, the NCO may be pushed aside and the duties given to another individual who can better meet the requirements.
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This highlights the adverse effect an unprepared NCO has on a complex, strategic organization such as NATO. It indicates the need to develop a common set of leadership, knowledge, skills and abilities an NCO requires for success in the multinational environment. 13 The same lesson applies to senior NCOs assigned to work in joint or interagency environments. Senior NCOs are most effective at getting soldiers to understand that protecting the civilian population is of strategic importance. However, at home, the perception was that the ROE was hampering our ability to protect ourselves. It is my job as a Congressman to fix that [not the NCO's]. But the strategic message was that it was important to use restraint on the battlefield, and that message was best delivered on behalf of the commander by the senior NCO. 23 In this case, it is to the strategic leader's distinct advantage to leverage the unique position of the senior NCO to shape the organizational culture in order to prevent a potentially negative "strategic corporal" situation from occurring. 24 Returning to the definition of strategic leadership provided earlier, it is clear the senior NCO is uniquely capable of providing valuable contributions at the strategic level.
Senior NCOs can and should have significant input on the development of policies and directives. Their unique level of credibility with the enlisted force enables them to effectively promote the commander's strategic vision and influence the organizational culture. In support of the Chairman's policy, it is suggested that more aggressive steps be taken to ensure the best-qualified senior NCOs are identified and better prepared to accept positions at strategic levels of the DoD. This will help ensure their unique capabilities and leadership attributes are leveraged to the organization's advantage.
Preparing Strategic Senior Warrant Officers
Senior warrant officers present a different situation for analysis when compared to senior NCOs. The case in support of senior NCO utilization in strategic environments 9 is based largely on their unique experiences and perspectives as enlisted leaders throughout their career, coupled with the fact that they represent a large enlisted population. The case for senior warrant officers serving as strategic leaders is focused on their technical expertise in their chosen field, as it is this technical expertise that the warrant officer corps is built upon.
The notion of developing warrant officers as strategic leaders is not without controversy, even among the warrant officer ranks. There are individuals from all ranks that believe warrant officers exist almost exclusively to fulfill the role of technical expert and that expanding that role blurs the lines between warrant and "O-grade" officers. 25 However, there is a shift in attitudes among the warrant officer population to those who firmly believe, in the words of Chief Warrant Officer Four (CW4) Wayne Baugh, that "in today's environment, warrant officers can no longer afford to be just technical experts." 26 Baugh points out, "Right or wrong, the roles of today's warrant officer are being broadened. Many would say this is because of the operational environment, globalization, and cultural shifts in the Army." 27 Clearly warrant officer roles are changing to reflect the rapidly expanding need for their technical knowledge and experience. In this constantly changing world, a strategic leader is well served by having strategically trained subject matter experts (SMEs). Warrant officers are technical SMEs that can intelligently shape policy and decisions at the strategic level based on their lifelong devotion to a specific career field. 28 They should be empowered for success at the strategic level, just like their senior NCO colleagues. purpose "was to examine and make recommendations on training and leader development tasks" as directed by the CSA. 30 The report "…is about the Army's technician leaders, our tactically-expert trainers and advisors, and their commitment to the Army." 31 Each of these reports will be examined in greater detail.
The CBO report on warrant officers does not make specific reference to the development of warrants as strategic leaders or advisors. However, it does counter the position that a warrant officer can serve only narrowly defined roles. It states, "The paper finds that current law permits considerable flexibility in the management of warrant officers, flexibility that has allowed the services to use the warrant officer system in markedly different ways. 43 These warrant officers were assigned to CASCOMs Directorate of Lessons Learned and Quality Assurance (DL2QA) where they were charged to "look at Army sustainment from the top down, across the different levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical." 44 As a result of this action, these three warrant officers interacted routinely with numerous strategic level organizations and generated dozens of substantive improvements..." 45 The ability of these warrant officers to produce positive results and affect far-reaching organizational changes across the sustainment community indicates the potential that most senior warrant officers can bring to strategic level organizations. Baugh concludes by arguing that the Army must enable senior warrant officers to be successful at the strategic level by offering advanced educational and training opportunities not currently afforded to most warrant officers. He writes, "This will afford the Army's technical experts the opportunity to share their expertise and experience when operating within a joint and foreign environment.
Warrant officers are capable of so much more than they are currently asked to do." 
Recommendations
Having addressed "why" senior NCOs and warrant officers should be educated on strategic leader competencies, it is appropriate to make some recommendations as to "how" this could be accomplished. Building a deeper "bench" of strategically educated talent is a primary goal of these recommendations. However, just as with officer development, this does not mean all inclusive NCO and warrant officer development.
Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC), USMC
Sergeant Major Bryan Battaglia stated during an interview that not every NCO would be educated for duties the strategic level. 47 The same holds true for warrant officers.
However, our institution would benefit from developing the policies, systems and programs that would build and track a deeper pool of well-qualified senior NCO's and warrant officers educated on strategic leader competencies. The following recommendations suggest approaches for consideration.
Capturing and Recording Improved Strategic Competencies
The DoD does not currently have a comprehensive personnel database that captures the strategic education and experiences of senior NCOs and Warrant Officers.
The first recommendation, applicable to both NCOs and warrant officers, is the development of methodologies that capture educational or assignment experiences an NCO or warrant officer achieves that better prepares them for assignments at the strategic level in a searchable personnel database. This will allow leaders and personnel managers to make more effective assignment decisions in strategic level organizations. 48 The basic ability to identify and screen for an individual that has been educated on strategic matters is critical to ensuring we receive the best return on investment made by the DoD in sending that individual to qualifying schools. This is a tremendous achievement that all career enlisted members strive for and rightly hold in high regard. However, once the CSM rank is achieved, there appears to exist what can be referred to as a "Culture of the Wreath" in the Sergeant Major ranks. This is the strong reluctance for CSMs to take off the wreath at the end of their tour. The culture developed because of the difficulty in attaining a CSM position and the associated opinion that once the rank is earned, it should never be removed. While the desire to remain an organization's senior enlisted leader is admirable, it is a cultural blinder to the experienced leader who could otherwise accept broadening assignments and educational opportunities that would enhance his ability to perform successfully at the strategic level.
One example of an NCO that was willing to remove his CSM wreath and accept a strategically broadening assignment is SGM William Zito. SGM Zito is a talented NCO with two successful tours as a battalion CSM. SGM Zito was selected to be one of only two Sergeants Major serving on Capitol Hill as a congressional fellow. At the time of this writing, SGM Zito served as the military fellow for U.S. Congressman John R. Carter (TX-31). His willingness to take off the wreath and pursue this challenging opportunity exposed him to strategic leadership at the highest levels of government. SGM Zito's experience serves as a strong example of how a qualified and properly identified senior NCO can perform successfully at the strategic level.
NCO Recommendation 2 -Increased Broadening Assignments
One potential reason for the "Culture of the Wreath" issue within the senior NCO ranks leads to the next recommendation. There are simply not enough challenging, broadening assignments available as a viable and career-enhancing alternative to CSM.
The DoD should create and offer more broadening assignment opportunities similar to the position held by SGM Zito. These assignments should focus on building bridges between the services, other governmental agencies, and international organizations.
There is a distinct advantage to expanding these opportunities beyond the officer ranks to senior NCOs. In a rapidly changing and complex global environment, the U.S.
Government will benefit by improved relationships and an increased understanding of the U.S. military within non-military and international organizations. Senior NCOs have a unique approach and "down to earth" communications style that allows them to be highly effective in building cross-cultural relationships and understanding. Mr. John Stone, Chief of Staff for U.S. Congressman John R. Carter from Texas, concurs with this assessment, stating in an interview that senior NCOs provide unique insight, an enlisted Soldier's perspective and exceptional work ethic at the strategic level. 49 The growing complexity of the strategic environment today suggests, and perhaps demands, that more broadening assignments in the interagency and international realms be created for well-prepared senior NCOs.
NCO Recommendation 3 -Formal Strategic Military Education
Perhaps the most critical component in developing strategic leader competencies in senior NCOs is education on strategic matters. A select group of nominative senior Roughly ten percent of the student population participates in these programs on a separate academic track for the last three to six months of the ten-month course. These select students focus more aggressively on complex strategic matters than the majority of students. These officers are specifically groomed for assignments at the highest levels of government. Using this advanced curriculum as a model, the USASMA could develop a three to four month strategic leader competency curriculum that would become part of the ten-month Sergeant Major Academy course. are former NCOs that display the talent and capability needed to perform the duties of a commissioned officer. It seems logical that warrant officers should be expected to perform at a higher level of leadership, and that they should receive leadership training similar to or in excess of that directed for NCOs in the EPMEP. As a stronger leadership culture evolves among warrant officers, the need for leadership development in warrant officer ranks will become more apparent and understood.
Warrant Officer Recommendation 3 -Warrant Officer Education and Assignments
While there is no DoD policy to support strategic level warrant officer education and broadening assignments, this should not prevent warrant officer leadership from pursuing and developing these opportunities while the policy gaps are addressed. The DoD should pursue warrant officer educational and broadening assignments in much the same way as described earlier for senior NCOs.
Warrant officers have already successfully attended ILE in limited numbers.
While ILE is not a strategic level education, it builds a strong foundation in effective staff work that benefits warrant officers and the organizations they serve. 
Unique and Valuable to Strategic Leaders
As the world becomes more complex and interconnected, more senior leaders need to develop an understanding of the evolving global security environment. Senior
NCOs bring a lifetime of enlisted rank experiences to the strategic level. This perspective is critical to the strategic leader making decisions affecting large numbers of enlisted forces. Further, the senior NCO is uniquely positioned and qualified to shape organizational culture among the enlisted ranks on behalf of the strategic leader he or she supports.
Warrant officers already utilize their combined leadership and technical expertise at the strategic level to impact organizational change and develop institutional 25 improvements. Leveraging these expanding roles, warrant officers must work with joint leadership to improve policies and educational options that align with the demands already placed upon them.
It is imperative that the DoD create personnel systems, strategic educational opportunities, and additional broadening assignments that fully prepare select NCOs and warrant officers for success as leaders and advisors at the strategic level. In doing so, these leaders are empowered to advise and support the vision and intent of strategic leaders. This will also enhance their ability to interact effectively with nonmilitary and international organizations, which will improve U.S. military relations within these entities. NCOs and warrant officers are an essential and relatively untapped resource in this area. They are professionals with great talent and leadership capabilities. The Department of Defense should demand more of these individuals at the strategic level, while also providing the resources and educational opportunities required to ensure their effectiveness and success.
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